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In December 2019, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) hosted a 
public workshop to explore updating the federal Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA) Rule.1  The workshop followed on the heels of 
 
*  Leah A. Plunkett is an associate dean & associate professor at University of New Hampshire 
Franklin Pierce School of Law and a faculty associate at the Berkman Klein Center for 
Internet & Society at Harvard University. 
1  Taken together, the federal Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act and the Children’s 
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alleged COPPA Rule violations by Google’s subsidiary YouTube, including 
a violation of taking personal information from children under thirteen 
without getting parental consent.2  A financial settlement for $170 million 
reached with YouTube and Google is the highest to date for COPPA non-
compliance,3 but some lawmakers believe the tech giant should have paid 
more.4  Senators on both sides of the aisle are raising an alarm that the FTC 
might be looking to make revisions that favor tech companies and 
“ultimately weaken[] children’s privacy instead of improving it.”5 
The senators are right to worry, but they are wrong to think that 
guarding, or even improving, the COPPA Rule will provide comprehensive 
protection for children’s digital data privacy.  Since the Rule was last 
updated in 2013, the “online environment for children continues to evolve at 
a rapid pace,” according to the FTC.6  The nature and the pace of this 
evolution necessitate more than Rule revision.  Federal lawmakers should 
start from scratch to enact new federal legislation that puts safeguards on 
what technology companies and other gatekeepers can do with the 
information they collect about all children under the age of eighteen, whether 
that information is collected directly from children or from parents, teachers, 
and other adults.  Currently, there is no digital privacy law that regulates all 
forms of “sharenting,” which occurs when a “parent, teacher, or other adult 
caregiver . . . who publishes, transmits, stores, or engages in other activities 
involving private information about a child in her or his care via digital 
channels.”7  A new law that would complement, but not repeal existing 
federal and state privacy protections (some of which do address some types 
of sharenting, most significantly by teachers),8 would address sharenting in 
all its forms, as well as private information that minors share about 
themselves. 
 
Online Privacy Protection Rule are referred to as “COPPA.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (1998); 
16 C.F.R. § 312 (2013).  
 2   Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google and YouTube Will Pay Record $170 
Million for Violations of Children’s Privacy Law (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2019/09/google-youtube-will-pay-record-170-million-alleged-
violations. 
 3   Id. 
 4   Emily Birnbaum, Bipartisan Senators Warn Against Efforts to Weaken Children’s 
Online Privacy Law, HILL (Oct. 4, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/464413-
bipartisan-senators-warn-against-efforts-to-weaken-childrens-online-privacy. 
 5   Id. 
 6   Request for Public Comment on the Federal Trade Commission’s Implementation of 
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 35842 (proposed July 25, 2019). 
 7   LEAH A. PLUNKETT, SHARENTHOOD: WHY WE SHOULD THINK BEFORE WE TALK 
ABOUT OUR KIDS ONLINE xv (2019). 
 8   See infra Part II. 
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This new federal law, Protecting the Private Lives of Adolescents and 
Youth (PPLAY), would create a lifelong prohibition on technology (or 
“tech”) companies from using all private digital data collected from any 
source about children under eighteen for targeted advertising or marketing, 
as well as decision-making about major life opportunities.  If another law or 
regulation permits a particular use of the data, or the child’s parent (if the 
child is under sixteen) or the child themselves (if over sixteen) has 
specifically opted into the use, then that limited use would suffice. 
Under PPLAY, even once children turn eighteen, the private data 
collected about them as children remains prohibited with regards to targeted 
advertising or marketing.  However, these companies can use information 
collected after they become adults for marketing and advertising purposes. 
The same lifelong prohibition would apply to the use of private data to 
make predictions or decisions about children’s opportunities (whether as 
minors or as adults) to gain access to major life activities, including 
education, employment, health care, life insurance, health insurance, and 
similar opportunities. 
PPLAY would also create a nutrition-label style disclosure system for 
digital tech products and services, which will give users comprehensive and 
consistent privacy information to better inform decision-making.  In 
addition, it would create a limited “right to erasure” of content posted about 
children by parents, grandparents, teachers, or other trusted adults, so long 
as that content is not legally protected by another law or supported by a 
compelling interest. 
There are privacy law reform efforts at the state and international levels 
that could inform the development of PPLAY.9  In recent years, many states 
have taken a small step towards removing digital gate-keeping from parents’ 
hands by passing new student privacy laws that regulate educational 
technology companies directly rather than focusing on schools and the 
requirement that schools get parental consent to share data.10  The European 
Union has enacted comprehensive digital privacy protection for its citizens 
of all ages,11 and California has done so as well.12  Our federal government 
can look to these and other recent privacy law innovations as inspiration for 
 
 9   See, e.g., Brenda Leong, FPF Guide to Student Data Protections Under SOPIPA: For 
K-12 School Administrators and Ed Tech Vendors, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM (Nov. 7, 
2016), https://fpf.org/2016/11/07/fpf-guide-student-data-protections-sopipa-k-12-school-
administrators-ed-tech-vendors/; see generally Commission Regulation 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 
2016, General Data Protection Regulation, 2016 O.J. (L 199) 1. 
 10   See, e.g., Leong, supra note 9. 
 11   See generally Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 9. 
 12   See generally California Consumer Privacy Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790.100–
1798.199 (2020). 
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crafting PPLAY and giving our children privacy and life opportunity 
protections from the decisions of the adults in their lives. 
 
This essay offers (1) a snapshot of the types of practices and categories 
of risks posed by sharenting; (2) a map of the limitations of the current 
federal legal landscape that addresses sharenting; and (3) a blueprint for a 
new, comprehensive federal youth privacy law (PPLAY) that protects youth 
privacy and, by extension, their current and future life opportunities. 
I. SHARENTING: WHAT IT IS & WHY IT IS RISKY (AND ALSO WHY IT CAN BE 
BENEFICIAL) 
A. Sharenting Snapshot 
“Sharenting” is a term that is rapidly gaining traction in the popular 
lexicon.  A portmanteau of “parenting” and “sharing,” the term typically 
refers to what parents post about their children on social media.13  While 
these activities are a critical part of sharenting, they are not the sum total of 
sharenting. 
Fully understood, “sharenting” refers to all the ways in which parents, 
grandparents, educators, and other trusted adults engage in any and all digital 
activities with the private information about the children in their homes or 
otherwise in their care.14  While social media may be the most visible of these 
activities, there are countless others.15  From “smart diapers” and sensor-
enabled baby booties, to giving a toddler a smart toy, having an Alexa at 
grandma’s house, teaching elementary schoolers to read with an app, 
monitoring a tween or teen’s whereabouts using a surveillance app and 
beyond, “sharenting” is the default setting of today’s adults.16 
Most of the time, adults fail to even realize that a particular activity 
constitutes sharenting.  Upon recognition, we are likely to still proceed with 
the best of intentions.  At worst, the sharenting may be negligent, but not 
malicious.17  Digital technologies deceive us about their status with respect 
to inside the brick and mortar “castles” of our homes, schools, and other 
spaces.  They masquerade as part of our everyday environs—objects we have 
 
 13   See, e.g., Rachel L. Harris and Lisa Tarchak, Mom and Dad, It’s My (Digital) Life, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/02/opinion/children-internet-
privacy.html. 
 14   PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at xxii. 
 15   See generally PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 2. 
 16   See generally PLUNKETT, supra note 7,  at 1–15. 
 17   PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at xvii. 
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on our counters, in our hands, on our walls, and on our bodies.18  They do 
not come equipped with a cigarette-style warning label or nutrition style 
information label, nothing that either shrieks a reminder that these devices 
are transmitting information outside of our immediate surroundings 
(warning label) or unpacks in a digestible way what that information is, 
where it is going, and why it is going there (information label).  Thus, we 
may overlook or fail to properly understand the connectivity inherent in the 
device, even as we rely on that connective functionality to make the device 
or service useful to us.  Even if we are mindful of the connectivity aspect, 
we are almost uniformly un-informed or under-informed of the scope, 
severity, and duration of the private information collection, aggregation, 
analysis, re-sharing, and action upon—because, as will be unpacked further 
in the legal landscape section, there is no reliable, accessible means for us to 
inform ourselves.19 
Each child’s digital journey is distinct and rapidly evolving, as both 
parental or other adult decision-making changes and the array of digital 
devices and services grows.20  What follows is a snapshot-style profile of the 
areas in which a child born today will be digitized—using a fictional child 
and real-world new and emerging technologies.  Kids today are conceived 
digital.21 
As an example, imagine a fictional child Tommy, a nod to Mark 
Twain’s canonical homage to youthful exuberance.22  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has stated it is not in the business of determining when life begins.23  
But, tech companies are.24  Fertility bracelets, fertility tracking apps, and 
similar devices engage precisely in that predictive space.  Thus, digital tech 
is foreshadowing Tommy’s evolution into existence.  His mother’s labor and 
delivery are videoed and shared on YouTube.  His newborn pictures, 
complete with vital statistics (including full name and place of birth), are 
 
 18   PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 79–80. 
 19   PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 80. 
 20   PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 2. 
 21   For the seminal work on the experiences of kids themselves in the digital era, see 
JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: HOW CHILDREN GROW UP IN A DIGITAL AGE 
(rev. ed. 2016). PLUNKETT, supra note 7 addresses the question of how the adults raising 
today’s kids behave with respect to children’s privacy. 
 22   The material set forth in Part I(A) offers a condensed version of the case study and 
accompanying discussion set forth in PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 1–15.  Where new 
information is included in this version that did not appear in Sharenthood, a specific reference 
for that information is provided.  
 23   See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 24   See PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 2 (describing use of fertility tracking app and bracelet 
to determine best window for conception; the value to consumers of these and other fertility 
predicting products is to advise them on the best time for procreation to try to create new life). 
PLUNKETT (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2020  2:40 PM 
462 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 44:3 
 
posted on social media.  Updates—detailed, regular—follow: “Tommy is 
having trouble sleeping, so we’re using a sensor-enabled baby booty to track 
his sleep patterns!” “We’re having trouble soothing Tommy, so we’re using 
an AI-nanny to help!”  “We think Tommy is getting woken up at night by 
wet diapers, so we’re using a smart diaper that notifies us when it’s time for 
a diaper change!”25  Posting about Tommy’s digital interactions constitutes 
two layers of sharenting: there is sharenting in the choice to use the digital 
device, like a smart diaper.  Then there is sharenting in the digital reveal of 
information about the device use. 
As Tommy enters the toddler years, his digital immersion continues.  
His parents put a video-enabled baby monitor in his nursery that they can 
monitor through an app on their phones.  They use FaceTime, Skype, and 
other digital video channels to keep in touch with Tommy’s grandparents, 
aunts, uncles, and other loved ones far away.  They text and email updates, 
and chronicle Tommy’s milestones through online photo-sharing and album-
making services.  They wonder why they can never find the picture they most 
want when they most want it, despite having thousands of them, so they get 
Tommy’s face printed on mugs and silk-screened on canvas wall-art, 
pillows, and t-shirts through an online photo-service.  Tommy promptly 
vomits on the pillow; his parents post a pic of the puke-stained fabric and tag 
the company that produced it, which sends them a new one, free of charge. 
Tommy’s parents put the digital fun right in Tommy’s hands too.  They 
give Tommy an Alexa designed for children.26  They give him a smart teddy 
bear.27  They give him their phones and iPads to watch YouTube Kids and 
play with apps.  Eventually, they cave in and give Tommy an iPad of his 
own.  Next, they give him an iPad potty to incentivize toilet training.  
Tommy’s interactions with these and other digital technologies, as well as 
Tommy’s parent’s reflections on these interactions, are preserved and posted 
online through pictures, videos, and texts: “OMG! Tommy just said his first 
word to Alexa! It’s the cutest!!”28 
 
 25   See Samantha Murphy Kelly, Pampers Is Making a ‘Smart’ Diaper. Yes, Really, CNN 
(July 19, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/19/tech/pampers-smart-diapers/index.html. 
 26   See Megan Wollerton, Amazon Launches New Alexa Device For Kids But Privacy 
Issues Will Still Scare Some Parents, CNET (June 12, 2019, 10:30 AM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-launches-new-alexa-device-for-kids-but-privacy-
issues-will-still-scare-some-parents/. 
 27   See, e.g., Stacey Gray, Federal Trade Commission: COPPA Applies to Connected 
Toys, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM (June 26. 2017), https://fpf.org/2017/06/26/federal-trade-
commission-coppa-applies-connected-toys/ (listing “teddy bears” as a type of connected or 
smart toy available on the market).  
 28   See Joshua McNichols & Carolyn Adolph, Parenting in the Age of Alexa? It’s 
Complicated, KUOW (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.kuow.org/stories/primed-season-3-
episode-1. 
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Tommy also receives digital tech immersion from the other adults in 
his young life.  His grandparents’ love affair with digital tech makes his 
parents’ affection for capturing, chronicling, and sharing look like amateur 
hour.  His grandparents watch him a few afternoons each week when his 
parents are at work.  They love sharing updates with their friends on social 
media—where their settings are not set to private.29  At first, Tommy’s 
parents barely notice the posts—so enmeshed are they in their own digital 
universes.  But when they start hearing from distant cousins about how 
fetching their son looks when he is screaming and dumping his spaghetti 
dinner on his head, Tommy’s parents begin to reconsider their position.  
They ask Tommy’s grandparents to dial back their digital kvelling, 
prompting inter-generational friction that plays out over a text chain—one 
that will cause arthritis to flare up even for the participants who did not enter 
the back and forth with any pains in their joints.  When Tommy’s 
grandparents agree to learn how to make their social media settings private, 
détente is reached—although Tommy’s mom continues to believe that her 
parents in-law would benefit from staging more flattering shots of Tommy.  
Tommy’s aunts and uncles do a better job of showing their nephew in his 
best light.  The only child in his generation, Tommy is the recipient of 
endless adoring attention.  Tommy’s parents are more comfortable with the 
pictures their siblings take; while their siblings have more friends than the 
grandparents, Tommy’s parents’ reason that the pictures are cuter, and their 
social media universe is set to private. 
Tommy’s parents start to lose track of who is taking pictures of Tommy 
and where those pictures are going.  Tommy’s babysitters think he is the 
cutest; they put him on their Instagram feeds.  The parents of other babies in 
playgroup, other kids on the playground, and at playdates when Tommy is 
old enough to play at other kids’ houses without parental chaperones—they 
are all taking and sharing pictures as well. 
When Tommy starts at the public elementary school in his 
neighborhood, the sharenting starts to multiply.  An app to track attendance.  
An app to teach him math.  Another app to teach him reading.  A software 
program to teach social-emotional learning.  A swipe-card linked to an app 
to track cafeteria purchases.  A sensor to track getting on and off the bus.  
 
 29   See Julie Jargon, Grandsharenting: When Grandparents Get Carried Away on 
Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/grandsharenting-
when-grandparents-get-carried-away-on-facebook-11574764204.  
PLUNKETT (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2020  2:40 PM 
464 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 44:3 
 
Social media and messaging surveillance.30  Facial recognition programs.31  
Databases that track school disciplinary actions and related school-to-prison 
pipeline consequences.  A surveillance watch that Tommy’s parents put on 
him which he wears throughout the day that allows him to contact them, his 
grandparents, and his aunts and uncles if he needs them; a watch that will 
alert Tommy’s parents if he ventures beyond their designated parameters 
allowing him to walk to school, attend school, then walk home.32  For some 
of the devices and services the school uses, the school sends home paperwork 
explaining the technology and seeking parental consent prior to use.  For 
most tech choices, no notifications or opportunities for participation 
decision-making are needed.  For a few products, Tommy’s parents first 
learn about them after notifications arrive in the mail indicating they have 
been subject to a data breach.33  Tommy’s parents already have credit 
monitoring set up for the family, so they brush this off. 
Tommy’s baseball team uses an app to schedule practice.  His summer 
camp uses an online program for registering—complete with facial 
recognition technology so pictures of Tommy and his fellow campers can be 
easily identified, tagged, and flagged for parents who want to see them.34  
Tommy’s parents install a RING doorbell surveillance system—which 
happens to share data with local law enforcement—so they know who is 
coming and going from their house; the system also captures footage of 
Tommy returning home one night past curfew, slightly inebriated, after a 
celebration with his baseball team descended into debauchery.35  Tommy’s 
parents install an app on his phone to provide them with around-the-clock 
updates on Tommy’s whereabouts.  Tommy is fine with the app, but he 
 
 30   See Benjamin Herold, Schools Are Deploying Massive Surveillance Systems. The 
Results Are Alarming, EDUC. WEEK (May 30, 2019), 
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/05/30/schools-are-deploying-massive-digital-
surveillance-systems.html. 
 31   See Davey Alba, Facial Recognition Moves To a New Front: Schools, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/business/facial-recognition-
schools.html. 
 32   See, e.g., GizmoWatch, VERIZON, https://www.verizonwireless.com/connected-
devices/verizon-gizmowatch/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2020) (describing one surveillance watch 
marketed for parents to use for child surveillance). 
 33   See Catherine Shu, Education Software Marker Pearson Says Data Breach Affected 
Thousands of Accounts in The U.S., TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 1, 2019), 
https://techcrunch.com/2019/07/31/education-software-maker-pearson-says-data-breach-
affected-thousands-of-accounts-in-the-u-s/. 
 34   See Julie Jargon, Facial Recognition Tech Comes to Schools and Summer Camps, 
WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2019, 12:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facial-recognition-goes-
to-camp-11564479008.  
 35   See Matthew Guariglia, Five Concerns About Amazon Ring’s Deals with Police, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/08/five-
concerns-about-amazon-rings-deals-police. 
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remains frustrated with the home’s smart thermostat which keeps out-
smarting him by overriding his attempts to keep the house at eighty-five 
degrees Fahrenheit so he can wear shorts and tank tops all winter. 
Tommy’s parents suggest that he apply to colleges somewhere warm if 
that is his preferred attire.  Tommy agrees.  He asks his school guidance 
counselor how to put his best, flip-flop covered foot forward.  She advises 
him to clean up his own social media, avoid entering into any online 
conversations that are offensive to prevalent shared cultural norms or could 
appear that way,36 and to be an active visitor on the websites of the schools 
he is most interested in.  Tommy starts to feel paranoid that schools are 
watching him, and he is not even there yet.  And much to his dismay, they in 
fact are watching to determine whether or not he gets in.  Tommy tunes out 
as she starts to describe the range of potential predictive analytics, they could 
run to determine his fit and likelihood of success in a school.  His counselor 
abandons her explanation before she reaches the ways in which whichever 
college he does attend is likely to track his progress to make predictions—
and, if necessary, pursue interventions—around his academic outcomes, 
mental health, and other domains.  For example, his dorm room could be 
“smart” and extract data about Tommy in his quotidian activities, including 
through giving him an Alexa.37 
In college, Tommy gets his first part-time job after taking an online 
employment temperament fitness test.38  He finds working in an office 
stultifying, so he quits and joins the gig economy, running random errands 
for strangers for pennies on the dollar.  Tommy fits in well at college, making 
friends and embracing the freedom away from his parents’ gaze.  But his 
parents continue to insist he use a monitoring app so they know his 
whereabouts at all times.39  Tommy resigns himself to that requirement.  One 
night, Tommy comes home from delivering food to find pictures of him as 
 
 36   See, e.g., Anya Kamentz, Harvard Rescinds Admission Of 10 Students Over Obscene 
Facebook Messages, NPR (June 6, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/06/06/531591202/harvard-rescinds-admission-of-10-
students-over-obscene-facebook-messages (providing example of youth shared content that 
led to negative outcome for the youth).  
 37   See Elizabeth Weise, Alexa, When’s My Next Class? This University Is Giving Out 
Amazon Echo Dots, USA TODAY (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2018/06/20/amazon-echo-dots-link-
student-accounts-northeastern-university/715360002/.  
 38   See CATHY O’NEILL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES 
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 105 (2016). 
 39   See Abby Ohlheiser, Don’t Leave Campus: Parents Are Now Using Tracking Apps 
To Watch Their Kids At College, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/22/dont-leave-campus-parents-are-
now-using-tracking-apps-watch-their-kids-college/. 
PLUNKETT (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2020  2:40 PM 
466 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 44:3 
 
an infant—pudgy, diaper-clad, screaming—printed out and plastered up and 
down the hall of his dorm room.  Enraged, he calls his parents, who trace the 
images back to old posts by his grandparents when they used to baby-sit him.  
His parents promise to look into how to deactivate the Facebook pages that 
belonged to his grandparents, now deceased.  Tommy’s parents, concerned 
about his potential to derail positive social relationships, attempt to distract 
him by sending him a smart pet: a robotic dinosaur which can roam the halls.  
While it cannot destroy the posters, it at least offers a distraction from them.40 
Is the dinosaur gift a form of sharenting?  At this point, Tommy is an 
adult, legally (for most purposes) if not yet emotionally and psychologically.  
He is certainly capable of deciding whether, when, how, and why to use a 
smart toy given to him as a gift.  Because Tommy is making the decision on 
his own terms about whether and how to use the toy, the dinosaur should not 
constitute sharenting.  The equation is different, of course, when parents or 
other trusted adults place a smart toy or other digital device or service in the 
hands of an infant or child who has not yet attained the legal age of majority 
and do not yet have an adult range of decision-making capacities available 
to them.41 
Determining when a digital interaction constitutes “sharenting” versus 
direct youth engagement with a digital offering can be a complex equation.  
As Tommy grows up, the variables are less clear: at what point are his 
parents facilitating his digital tech use (such that his use is a sharenting 
decision), and at what point is he in command?  An infant or young child 
lacks the agency and other capacities to procure, set-up, and engage with a 
smart stuffed animal.  Digital tech use in these early years thus can only 
reasonably be understood as sharenting: actions by a parent, grandparent, or 
other trusted adult to transmit children’s private digital information by 
putting the child in a position where the information is conveyed to one or 
more digital tech providers—as well as any unwanted third-parties who 
might be in a position to intercept it. 
In the elementary, middle, and high school years, the calculation shifts 
dramatically.  Tommy’s parents more or less still control the purse strings, 
especially in the earlier part of that life-stage spectrum.  Their control over 
Tommy obtaining and using digital tech is no longer so absolute.  Tommy 
may circumvent access or content controls at his school, for instance, and 
 
 40   See, e.g., PLEO, https://www.pleoworld.com/pleo_rb/eng/products.php (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2020) (displaying a smart dinosaur toy). 
 41   But see Michael S. Lewis, Pervasive Infancy: Reassessing the Contract Capacity of 
Adults in Modern America, U.N.H.L. REV. (publication forthcoming) (Jan. 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3526991 (arguing that adults are 
actually no differently situated from children when it comes to today’s complex contracts of 
adhesion in big tech and other consumer domains). 
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access digital content his parents might have told him is off limits.42  Tommy 
is likely to obtain a device of his own at a fairly young age and no amount 
of in-person or digitally-based parental surveillance is sufficient to fully lock 
down what he does, where he does it, or with whom he does it on that device. 
In such instances, many interactions are best understood as multi-
faceted: there is a parental choice to give a device,43 followed by choices by 
the youth user of that device about how to use it.44  It is unnecessary to 
taxonomize every decision, or for every decision to need to be one hundred 
percent sharenting, to accept as accurate this descriptive point: across the 
life-stages of youth, there are actions parents can and do take that are theirs 
and theirs alone, or theirs primarily, to reveal their children’s private 
information digitally, such as posting on social media or choosing to have a 
smart device in their home that picks up private data about everyone in the 
family. 
Sharenting is ubiquitous and life-long (pre-life, as it were).45  This is 
cause for concern because the nature of the information transmitted creates 
privacy harms,46 as well as harms to children’s current and future 
opportunities.  In turn, these privacy and opportunity harms fundamentally 
alter children’s experiences such that they are left without private places to 
play—to make mischief, make mistakes, and grow up better for having made 
them—and through that play, to develop the sense of agency and autonomy 
necessary to become the sequential selves they are meant to be.47 
The sections below unpack these concerns: the impact of sharenting on 
privacy, opportunity, and sense of self.  These over-arching concerns 
manifest in three types of risks: (1) criminal, illegal, or dangerous 
consequences; (2) legal—but invasive, opaque, and suspect consequences; 
and (3) identity formation consequences (reputation, sense of self, 
interpersonal relationships).  There are also benefits from sharenting, 
 
 42   See, e.g., Nancy Willard, Complying with Federal Law for Safe Internet Use, 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, 
https://www.aasa.org/SchoolAdministratorArticle.aspx?id=10370 (Mar. 23, 2020) 
(explaining that children are able to get around blocked content and arguing for teaching 
children responsible Internet use for when they do access content they have been told is off 
limits).  
 43   This is understood as sharenting. See PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at xv. 
 44   This is understood as a youth decision. See generally PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 
21 (documenting the myriad ways that youth make their own digital choices today). 
 45   See supra note 24 and accompanying text (listing fertility predictive technologies). 
 46   For this analysis, “privacy is about self-creation.” PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at xvi.  
 47   Sharenting raises other concerns as well that are beyond the scope of this analysis, 
including whether parental involvement with screens diminishes their interpersonal 
interactions with their children and whether parents are setting a poor example for how to 
engage the world by prioritizing device-time over face-to-face time. 
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discussed below, following the risk assessment.  Both the threats and the 
upside are offered in encapsulated form to establish the contours of the 
landscape on which the call for new legislative action is predicated. 
B. Criminal, Illegal, or Dangerous Ramifications48 
Digital transmission of intimate information—including, but not 
limited to, a child’s geographic location, identifying information (full name, 
date and place of birth, address, and similar details), and preferences (likes, 
dislikes, hopes, fears)—expose children to the risk of wrongdoing by 
intended recipients who misuse or abuse the information or by unintended 
third parties who intercept the information. 
These harms include adults in the social media orbit of a parent, 
grandparent, or other trusted adult who use sharented information to 
threaten, stalk, abuse, or otherwise engage inappropriately with a child.  
Perpetrators of child abuse or mistreatment often seek victims whom they 
know.49  Sharented information arms these bad actors with intimate 
information about where and how to seek out children for misconduct.  
Sometimes, even parents themselves are the bad actors, subjecting their 
children to abuse or other egregious conduct for sharenting purposes, such 
as creating a YouTube family prank channel. 
Unintended third-party recipients may also acquire and act upon 
sharented information; notably, many pornographic or abusive images of 
children online have their origins in real photos that bad actors then 
manufacture into illicit content.  Sharented information can also be used to 
perpetrate identity theft or fraud against children, as well as to track, stalk, 
or otherwise act against children based on their location or related 
information, such as hacking into a digital baby-monitor and talking to a 
child. 
C. Legal—Invasive, Opaque, and Suspect50 
Once information is sharented, the institutions and individuals who 
 
 48   The material set forth in Part I(B) offers a condensed version of the analysis forth in 
PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 21–25.  Where information is set forth that appears in 
Sharenthood, no additional specific reference is provided beyond this footnote. Where new 
information is included in this version that did not appear in Sharenthood, a specific reference 
for that information is provided.  
 49   See, e.g., Francis M. Williams, The Problem of Sexual Assault, in SEX OFFENDER 
LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 13-49 (Richard G. Wright ed., 2009) (stating that 
over half of child abuse survivors knew the perpetrators). 
 50   The material set forth in Part I(C) offers a condensed version of the analysis forth in 
PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 25–38. Where information is set forth that appears in Sharenthood, 
no additional specific reference is provided beyond this footnote.  Where new information is 
included in this version that did not appear in Sharenthood, a specific reference for that 
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lawfully receive it are subject to relatively few constraints on what they can 
do with it.  The constraints that do exist typically come from criminal or 
other laws of general applicability, meaning that they are not specific to 
sharenting or children’s digital privacy; for example, parents are bound by 
child welfare laws when they engage in sharenting, so they cannot engage in 
abusive or neglectful behavior, film their behavior, post the videos to 
YouTube, and have the behavior be legally protected by virtue of having 
been sharented.51  There are a few specific areas where private information 
about youth is more protected against transmission, whether it is sharented 
or coming from youth themselves; notably, as discussed further below, 
schools represent one specific sector of enhanced youth privacy regulation 
(although the protections there are not as robust as needed for comprehensive 
privacy protection). 
But most sharenting takes place within a legal framework under which 
parents, grandparents, educators, and other adults click “I accept” on terms 
and conditions of use, privacy policies, or other contractual policies from 
tech providers.  Doing so reserves broad, unfettered discretion to the provider 
and its affiliated third parties over whether, how, why, and to what ends they 
act upon sharented information.  Through this framework, sharented 
information can travel fast and far, well past the tech company with which 
the parent is aware they are engaging (like a social media company) and past 
the people whom the parent understands they are reaching through the tech 
company (like people in their friend circle).  This porous chain leads to a 
rapid, wide-reaching, and multi-faceted transmission of information. 
Here are some of the significant types of ways that tech providers, third 
parties, and other actors engage with sharented information: to profile 
children for advertising and marketing purposes; to use children’s data for 
product development purposes;52 to put information about youth who 
misbehave or engage in delinquent acts (meaning criminal if done by an 
adult) into law enforcement databases; to track a family for immigration 
enforcement action (law enforcement review of social media posts); to 
engage in predictive decision-making about a child’s likely academic 
progress; to assess a teenager’s application to college or other life 
opportunity where gate-keepers have both discretion and decision-making 
 
information is provided.  
 51   See, e.g., PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 63–64. 
 52   See, e.g., Kashmir Hill & Aaron Krolik, How Photos of Your Kids Are Powering 
Surveillance Technology, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/11/technology/flickr-facial-recognition.html 
(explaining how pictures that parents posted of children on social media—sharented 
content—was used to develop facial recognition products). 
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authority; to help law enforcement engage in criminal investigations;53 and 
to issue public health warnings based on an individual child’s experience.  
These and similar types of behaviors may result in adverse or under-
informed actions against or about youth-based on sharented data. 
A prominent, yet often under-acknowledged, participant in the 
sharenting ecosystem is the data-broker industry.  This industry, loosely 
regulated at the federal level (due to a lack of a specific federal law regulating 
data brokers as well as lax enforcement of existing consumer protection 
laws), exists to acquire, compile, analyze, and sell private information about 
people (including youth) to clients who are willing to pay.  It is difficult, if 
not impossible, to obtain transparent, comprehensive data about the type and 
depth of data that data-brokers have.  A study by the Center on Law and 
Information Policy (CLIP) at Fordham Law School looked at the marketing 
lists held by over a dozen data-brokers and found information about children 
as young as two years old in the brokers’ holdings.54  The researchers 
determined that the information was coming from schools, seemingly from 
surveys that staff and the students themselves were completing.  The lists 
held by the brokers include names of adolescent girls for family planning 
services, Jewish kids in the United States, and “funny-looking” kids in the 
United States.  One example of the granularity of the information is that the 
American Red Cross was able to identify, and then reach-out to, a minor as 
a strong candidate to be a specific type of blood donor based on data-broker 
information. 
As today’s “conceived digital” generation comes of age, it is reasonable 
to expect that gate-keepers’ decisions about the opportunities available to 
youth will be increasingly data-driven—and that the data used will be 
increasingly invasive and expansive.  Few legal barriers are in place to limit 
the aggregation, transmission, and action upon sharented information, and 
there is a trend toward algorithmically mediated outcomes in areas like 
employment.55  Thus the market is open for products and services that inform 
decision-makers who their strongest candidates for employment are, 
education, certain insurance, and other major life opportunities.  While there 
does not yet appear to be a publicly available “personal capital score” type 
of product that purports to amass, integrate, and analyze all the sharented 
information tech companies are able to acquire, the introduction of such an 
 
 53   See Herold, supra note 30. 
 54   N. Cameron Russell et al., Transparency and the Marketplace for Student Data, CLIP 
CENTER ON LAW AND INFORMATION POLICY 1–2 (June 6, 2018), 
https://www.fordham.edu/info/23830/research/10517/transparency_and_the_marketplace_fo
r_student_data. 
 55   See O’NEILL, supra note 38, at 107–08. 
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offering is not akin to science fiction.56  Vast amounts of youth personal 
digital data have been and are being aggregated and put toward predictive 
ends by different gatekeepers. In the absence of comprehensive federal 
privacy laws to prevent sharenting, data-driven predictive products likely 
will continue to be introduced into the marketplace and adopted by decision-
makers. 
D. Identity Formation Consequences (Reputation, Interpersonal 
Relationships, Sense of Self)57 
Even in real life, away from near-future hypothetical scenarios, 
sharenting can significantly impact the life experiences and opportunities of 
youth, both while they are young and as they grow up.  These impacts strike 
in the spheres of children’s lived experiences.  People they meet, or people 
who hear about them, might form opinions of them based on sharented 
information.  Youth have no legal right to consent (or not) to the sharing of 
this information—indeed, they might not even have known about the 
sharing.  The most significant hit, however, lands at the core of children’s 
personal experiences: how they come to understand their ostensibly private 
spaces (like home, school, the playground, and others) as far less private, far 
more public than they appear.  This recognition impacts children’s comfort 
with and ability to play, experiment, and explore without an outside gaze and 
the legitimate fear of exposure and reactions by others to exposed 
information, both in present and in the future. 
In the brick and mortar era, what children did as children was far more 
protected than it is now.  In the United States, there was no widespread 
cultural norm of parents posting ads in local newspapers or renting billboard 
spaces on the highway to tell readers and drivers that their offspring had 
completed a particular rite of passage, like sleeping through the night or 
starting their menstrual periods.  When a child encountered social 
difficulties, like a schoolyard bully or cliquish behavior, the adults who got 
involved likely did so in ways that did not create a widely available written 
record, like picking up the phone to call another parent.  If a child wanted to 
play pretend or make up dance moves with their friends, there was no AI-
assistant with which to interact that would then be acquiring private 
information, as there would be nowadays. 
 
 56   See PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 101–02. 
 57   The material set forth in Part I(D) offers a condensed version of the analysis forth in 
PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 38–52. Where information is set forth that appears in Sharenthood, 
no additional specific reference is provided beyond this footnote. Where new information is 
included in this version that did not appear in Sharenthood, a specific reference for that 
information is provided.  
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In today’s digital world, children meet people who already know 
information about them that the children did not share themselves.  These 
people are able to make assumptions, judgments, and predictions on who 
children are and who they will become based on just this sharented 
information.  Indeed, this processing of, responding to, and acting upon 
sharented information can take place without any mediation by digital 
technology.  Once the sharented information is out in the world, it can travel 
by word of mouth as well as digitally.  For instance, the parents of a high 
school student may find out from a friend who is the social media friend of 
the parents of their child’s prom date that the date has oppositional and 
defiant tendencies—and judge the date based on that sharented information.  
Even when an adult who is sharenting information may perceive that 
information as positive, the child themselves might not see it as positive.  
Even when the child does see it as positive, the creation of youth identity by 
parents and other adults, rather than by the youth themselves, does impact 
the sense of agency and autonomy the child is likely to feel as they come of 
age and come into their own. 
 
Privacy is essential for play: the space to experiment, to make mischief 
and mistakes and grow up the better for having made them.  Play is essential 
for identity-formation.  Absent spaces that children recognize and respect as 
private—in fact, not just in label—the “conceived digital” generation is and 
will continue to be challenged to explore who they are and how they want to 
be in the world.  A perpetual gaze stifles creation, imagination, and learning.  
Having outsized consequences for mischief or a minor misstep, especially 
those that endure past a finite point in time,58 erodes our children’s freedom 
to be present in the moments that mark their lives without the anxiety or 
erodes the reality that those moments can and will somehow be recorded and 
used against them down the road. 
This reality positions our children to understand themselves as the 
products of their parents’ and other adults’ reflections of them, rather than as 
agents or subjects of their own lives.  Of course, the individual and actual 
experiences of this new reality for individual kids within the conceived 
digital cohort will vary.  This individual variation, however, does not erode 
the societal transformation of our understanding of childhood and 
adolescence from protected spaces to tracked spaces. 
 
 58   For instance, imagine a teen whose first day of middle school is marked by printouts 
of an embarrassing photo of them from their parents’ old blog. 
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E. Benefits59 
Even as it presents a new threat to the life-stages of childhood and 
adolescence, as well as to the lived experiences of individual kids and teens, 
sharenting may also confer some benefits.  These benefits may redound to 
parents, grandparents, and other adults doing the sharenting; to youth being 
sharented; and to related individual and institutional actors. 
Sharenting may foster connections by bridging physical or other 
distances between family members and friends or by fostering new 
relationships between those who share interests and affinities which identify 
and nurture digitally.  These interests may arise in social or recreational 
points of connection.  They may also go toward building networks or 
pursuing goals that transcend entertainment or other forms of enjoyment.  
For instance, parents raising children with disabilities or serious medical 
conditions might find both solace and sustenance in connecting with other 
similarly situated families.  Such bonds may be emotional or be goal-
directed, including sharing information about medical providers, or 
organizing to try to reform health care delivery and other essential services. 
Sharenting may also foster positive experiences for kids and families 
that nurture innovation.  Think about a family that is passionate about 
science, for example, and their child’s science fair project is a blue-ribbon 
winner.  The proud parents film the invention, put it on YouTube, and the 
child receives national attention for their innovation.  That child has been 
sharented.  People the child does not yet know, and may in fact never know, 
will form impressions about them.  Yet, those impressions are likely to be 
positive and bring with them the creation of opportunities, such as a 
scholarship offer to a science camp.  While not every child is a budding 
Einstein, sharenting as a pathway for building positive reputational attributes 
and constructive opportunities is available in less dramatic forms. 
It is rare to eliminate these privacy harms within these and other 
beneficial paradigms.  Rather, they are mitigated or outweighed by the value 
of the resulting benefit.  For a family engaged in sharenting via a Facebook 
group for families of children with the same disability, the value is great.  To 
these families, the value of finding information about new medical or other 
care providers, using collective action to impact the services offered in the 
public-school system, or making other progress toward greater health and 
well-being is likely to address a more immediate, more acute need than 
 
 59   The material set forth in Part I(E) offers a condensed version of the analysis forth in 
PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 18–21. Where information is set forth that appears in Sharenthood, 
no additional specific reference is provided beyond this footnote. Where new information is 
included in this version that did not appear in Sharenthood, a specific reference for that 
information is provided.  
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privacy protection.  This is not to reduce sharenting decisions to a purely 
utilitarian calculus—an “ends justify the means” equation—but to position 
quotidian sharenting choices as multi-faceted, even as they are made with a 
swipe of a screen or a click of a mouse. 
II. CURRENT FEDERAL LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
A. Bedrock Sharenting Legal Framework60 
Parents enjoy a super-charged, constitutionally protected liberty 
interest for most of the decisions they make around having and raising 
children.  State law requires parents to provide basic support for their 
children and to send them to school.  It is illegal and, in some instances, 
criminal for parents to subject their children to abuse or neglect.  It is 
criminal for parents to subject their children to the manufacturing of child 
pornography.  And it is of course illegal or criminal, depending on the 
underlying legal schema, for parents to violate laws of general applicability 
in their interactions with their children; for example, a parent could not 
commit arson against the family home, with children inside, and defend 
against prosecution because the parent was taking an action related to home 
and off-spring. 
Within these broad parameters, however, parents have wide latitude to 
direct their children’s upbringing.  For today’s “conceived digital” cohort, 
this direction includes decisions about whether, why, with whom, how, and 
when to sharent.  For parents, unless the sharenting crosses a legal boundary 
that is not sharenting specific (like child abuse or child pornography), federal 
law and almost all state laws leave the sharenting choice to the parents and 
offer youth no comprehensive, nationwide legal recourse in response to 
sharenting. 
B. COPPA61 
To focus on federal law, it is important to address the apparent, 
understandable misperception that exists among some parents based on the 
 
 60   The material set forth in Part II(A) offers a condensed version of the analysis forth in 
PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 77–96. Where information is set forth that appears in Sharenthood, 
no additional specific reference is provided beyond this footnote. Where new information is 
included in this version that did not appear in Sharenthood, a specific reference for that 
information is provided.  
 61   The material set forth in Part II(B) offers a condensed version of the analysis forth in 
PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 87–89. Where information is set forth that appears in Sharenthood, 
no additional specific reference is provided beyond this footnote. Where new information is 
included in this version that did not appear in Sharenthood, a specific reference for that 
information is provided.  
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law’s name that the federal Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA) and its accompanying Rule apply to all private information about 
minors transmitted online.62  COPPA and the Rule only protect personal 
information collected directly from kids under thirteen.  But, even if the age 
range for COPPA and the Rule were expanded to protect all minors—as 
lawmakers, regulators, and other stakeholders have recently discussed63—
limiting privacy protection to personal information that comes directly from 
kids of any age leaves a vast amount of information about kids unprotected 
by COPPA.  It also reveals that COPPA is built around a flawed premise: 
that parents can be the strongest protectors of their children’s data privacy. 
Around the clock, parents, grandparents, educators, baby-sitters, 
coaches, and other trusted adults are sharing personal information about the 
children in their care through digital technologies.  As described above, these 
sharenting behaviors include posting about kids on social media, using 
tracking or surveillance devices on kids, and using digital programs to 
perform school functions like collecting lunch payments.  They include using 
fertility tracking apps, smart diapers and baby booties, fitness trackers, and 
software portals to sign-up for summer camp. 
COPPA and the Rule do not offer kids of any age comprehensive 
privacy protections from the adults who share their information in the course 
of their daily lives, often without realizing they are doing so.  There is one 
key exception that exists at a blurry point along the spectrum of sharenting 
choices and youth choices: when a school is sharenting by offering or 
requiring students under thirteen to engage with a digital program from a 
provider covered by COPPA, the school either needs to get parental consent 
or meet the criteria for giving substituted parental consent.  But COPPA is 
silent on when an educator is digitally transmitting children’s personal 
information themselves, such as by using an app to track attendance, rather 
than putting a digital program in children’s hands. 
There are also online providers that COPPA does not regulate, even 
when a child under thirteen is engaging with that provider.  COPPA and the 
Rule are limited to commercial online providers whose services target kids 
under thirteen or who know that kids under thirteen use their services.  Non-
commercial providers, such as non-profit corporations, are excluded from 
coverage, as are providers who offer general online services and do not 
 
 62   The existence of this misperception has been found by researchers doing qualitative 
focus-groups with families around privacy. Phone conversation between the author and Dr. 
Monica Bulger (winter 2020). 
 63   See Request for Public Comment on the Federal Trade Commission’s Implementation 
of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 35842, 35846 (proposed July 
25, 2019). 
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actually know that kids under thirteen use their products.  As long as COPPA 
and the Rule have any sort of carve-outs for certain types of online providers, 
tech companies will have the incentive and ability to structure their activities 
to avoid being subject to COPPA. 
Even when covered by COPPA, it is difficult, if not impossible, for 
parents to navigate the privacy policies, terms of use, and other information 
supplied by tech providers.  With few exceptions, parental consent is the 
main requirement under COPPA for whether or not an online service 
provider can collect personal information directly from kids under thirteen. 
C. Notice & Consent64 
Parents are entrusted to be their children’s digital privacy gatekeepers.  
However, parents often accept a company’s policies and terms without being 
able to think through what a provider will be doing with their children’s 
personal information.  Policies, terms, and related content can be difficult 
even to find, especially for smart devices where a user might need to look at 
a package insert or on an app or website.  Once located, this content is dense, 
complex, and typically retains significant loopholes for providers to take 
unspecified actions to improve products or share information with third 
parties that are providing product support or fulfilling another function.  
Thus, even parents who locate and read the relevant information are unlikely 
to understand the full extent of the activities which the company is asking 
for parental consent to engage in. 
This superficial “notice and consent” construct forms the legal basis for 
all sharenting, not just the sharenting decisions that involve youth interaction 
with a COPPA-covered digital technology.65  Whenever a parent uses a 
digital device or service for themselves without giving any use to their child 
as well, the general legal authority the tech provider has to collect, transmit, 
aggregate, or otherwise act upon the data is grounded in a manifestation of 
consent that the parent has already given.  These contracts—sometimes 
called “click-wrap” or “click through”—are of dubious value given the 
information and bargaining asymmetries between the parties.66  Yet, those 
are the legal underpinnings upon which parents transmit ultrasound pictures, 
birth announcements, video footage of a nursery, location data, and so much 
 
 64   The material set forth in Part II(C) offers a condensed version of the analysis forth in 
PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 79–83. Where information is set forth that appears in Sharenthood, 
no additional specific reference is provided beyond this footnote. Where new information is 
included in this version that did not appear in Sharenthood, a specific reference for that 
information is provided.  
 65   For instance, this could happen with a parent giving a toddler an iPad then clicking 
“accept” for apps that the toddler is using. 
 66   See generally Lewis, supra note 41. 
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more. 
Adults other than parents—grandparents, aunts, uncles, baby-sitters, 
friends, coaches, teachers, and others—are also establishing these contracts 
that then serve as the basis for their sharenting.  For non-parent adults, there 
are some professional roles in which federal and state laws (that do not apply 
to parents) apply.  Education, a key area in which this occurs, is discussed 
further below.  For sharenting by non-parents where no sector specific 
federal or state law applies, the notice and consent framework controls as 
between the adult doing the sharenting and the tech provider. 
To the extent that any legal framework is relied upon to control the 
relationship between the non-parent engaged in sharenting, the child whose 
information is being sharented, and the parents of that child, it tends to be 
some form of notice and consent.  Realistically, within close personal 
relationships like grandparents or friends, norms, or customs rather than 
contracts tends to govern.  For more arm’s length relationships like a coach 
or camp counselor, the best practice is to have a contract in place between 
the parent and the non-parent adult in which the parent authorizes the 
sharenting.67  Absent such permission, the non-parent engaged in the 
sharenting runs the risk of garnering parental ire or providing the basis for a 
legitimate parental legal grievance for publicizing or transmitting 
information about a minor child without any authority to do so; for example, 
Facebook offers parents the ability to request removal of pictures posted of 
their children (if under the age of thirteen).68  A child typically cannot give 
consent to information sharing about themselves outside of limited 
circumstances like certain types of medical treatment or, as of January 2020 
in California, specific types of digital information sharing.69  In some states, 
recording audio or video of a person without consent is a criminal act, 
rendering of heightened import compliance with consent requirements for 
activities covered by the criminal code.70 
 
 67   See generally Leah A. Plunkett, Summer in Cyberspace: Protecting Your Kids’ 
Digital Privacy at Camp, FERPA SHERPA (July 2017), https://ferpasherpa.org/plunkett1/. 
 68   See, e.g., Facebook, “Photos or Videos That Violate Your Privacy,” FACEBOOK (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2020) (explaining process for parent to request removal of photo of child 
under 13). 
 69   See CCPA Fact Sheet, California Attorney General (Winter 2019), 
https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/CCPA%20Fact%20Sheet%20%2
800000002%29.pdf (explaining opt-in rights for personal information held by children ages 
13–16). 
 70   In New Hampshire, where I live and teach, this is a felony.  N.H. Rev. Stat. § 570-
A:2(I). See also Todd Feathers, Do Ring Cameras Violate Wiretapping Laws? New 
Hampshire Is About To Find Out, VICE (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/3a8k79/do-ring-cameras-violate-wiretapping-laws-new-
hampshire-is-about-to-find-out. 
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D. FERPA71 
In at least one state (Louisiana), violations of state student privacy law 
carry specific criminal penalties.  While this heavy-handed approach to 
student privacy is an outlier, education is the sector specific area where non-
parent professionals are subject to the most robust federal privacy law 
scheme focused on minors.  The federal Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA) applies to primary and secondary schools that receive 
federal funding.72  Under FERPA, educators need parental consent to share 
“personally identifiable information” (PII) from “education records”—
unless an exception applies. 
The two exceptions to parental consent that tend to facilitate sharenting 
are the “directory exception” and the “legitimate school official exception.”  
Through these avenues, parental consent can be bypassed in favor of an 
educator’s decision to transmit PII to a third-party tech company in the 
course of providing classroom, extracurricular, office, or other education-
related services.  The avenues differ in scope of the information that can be 
provided.  The “directory exception” permits a narrower scope of 
information to be released, allowing educators to share basic identification 
information, such as name, address, and class year (unless a parent has opted 
out of having their child’s information included in these directory 
transmissions).  The “legitimate school official exception” makes a broader 
swath of PII available for transmission—provided that certain criteria are 
met.  Under this exception, the types of PI transmitted are not limited.  To be 
valid, however, the PII must be shared with a third-party that is providing a 
service that would otherwise be done in house, is operating under the control 
of the educational institution, and is not re-sharing the information. 
Effectuating proper use of the legitimate school official exception 
requires a directly negotiated contract (rather than a click-wrap), the use of 
template contractual terms that incorporate relevant FERPA and state student 
privacy law, or a similar approach that ensures the requirements for reliance 
on this exception are met.  Despite schools’ best efforts, it may prove 
challenging to implement this exception according to the letter of the law.  
Proper implementation is achieved best with multi-stakeholder review and 
input, including expertise from technologists and lawyers as well as 
 
 71   The material set forth in Part II(D) offers a condensed version of the analysis forth in 
PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 81–83. Where information is set forth that appears in Sharenthood, 
no additional specific reference is provided beyond this footnote. Where new information is 
included in this version that did not appear in Sharenthood, a specific reference for that 
information is provided.  
 72   20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b); 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.1 et seq. 
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educators.73  Assembling that type of team structure may be beyond the 
financial resources or bandwidth of a school system.  The legal alternative—
asking for parental consent—is unlikely to better protect children due to the 
challenges or failures of parents as privacy gatekeepers when accepting 
notice and consent terms.  When students are in well-resourced, privacy-
savvy school systems, they may enjoy more robust privacy protection in 
school than at home.74  However, for those students in different 
circumstances, the depth and breadth of digital tech used in schools can 
compound privacy concerns when there are two layers of gatekeepers—the 
school with the parents in the background—without the tools necessary to 
consistently and effectively protect youth privacy. 
E. PPRA75 
There is an often-overlooked step-cousin to COPPA and FERPA: the 
Protection of Pupil Rights Act and Amendment (PPRA).76  Under this federal 
law, schools that are administering certain types of survey instruments need 
to obtain parental consent when the instrument requires students to share 
certain types of sensitive personal information (PI), such as information 
about sexuality, religion, or similar topics.77  PPRA also requires that parents 
be able to opt-out their children from PI collection that will be used to market 
to them. 
PPRA is poorly drafted and poorly understood.  In theory, it should 
have applicability to many more types of digital educational technology than 
those to which schools actually seem to apply it.  For example, if a school is 
using software to teach social-emotional learning (involving questions 
around sexuality and psychology, for instance), then the school should 
 
 73   See Leah Plunkett, Alicia Solow-Niederman, & Urs Gasser, Framing the Law & 
Policy Picture: A Snapshot of K-12 Cloud-Based Ed Tech & Student Privacy in Early 2014, 
BERKMAN KLEIN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY 24 (June 2014), 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/publications/2014/law_and_policy_snapshot. 
 74   To see top-flight privacy-protecting contractual resources for use in K-12 schools, 
please visit the Student Data Privacy Consortium at https://privacy.a4l.org/. 
 75   The material set forth in Part II(E) offers a condensed version of the analysis forth in 
PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 83. Where information is set forth that appears in Sharenthood, 
no additional specific reference is provided beyond this footnote. Where new information is 
included in this version that did not appear in Sharenthood, a specific reference for that 
information is provided.  
 76   20 U.S.C. § 1232h; 34 C.F.R. § 98. 
 77   See Dalia Topelson Ritvo, Privacy and Student Data: An Overview of Federal Laws 
Impacting Student Information Collected Through Networked Technologies 16–17, 
CYBERLAW CLINIC (June 2016), https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/27410234. 
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follow PPRA in addition to COPPA78 and FERPA.79  Absent PPRA being 
followed, under federal student privacy laws, a school lawfully could have 
children under thirteen take a survey about sensitive topics, offered by a for-
profit software company, without getting parental consent at any point, 
provided the legitimate school official exception under FERPA and the 
substituted parental consent path under COPPA are followed. 
If adhered to, PPRA also provides an additional safeguard on marketing 
based on PI.  Neither FERPA’s legitimate school exception or COPPA’s 
substituted consent should permit marketing based on personally identifiable 
information (FERPA) or personal information (COPPA); both avenues 
require that the third-party recipient of information use it as specified and 
not re-share it (FERPA) or only use it for purposes directly related to the 
school (COPPA).  Loopholes remain, however, such as an education tech 
tool from a non-profit company into which a student over thirteen directly 
inputs personal information.  FERPA does not control here because the 
student is inputting the information, rather than a school official.  COPPA 
does not apply either since it is a non-profit tech company and the student is 
over thirteen years old.80 
Despite the greater level of protection that more consistent and 
comprehensive PPRA adherence would provide, this benefit would accrue 
to a limited group of sharenting permutations: those occurring from the 
decisions of educators (not parents, grandparents, or other trusted adults) to 
use a certain sub-set of ed tech offerings in a defined set of ways. 
F. Non-Federal Privacy Innovation 
In the last few years, legislatures other than the U.S. Congress have 
made progress on comprehensive data privacy legislation for both minors 
and adults.  Notably, the European Union (EU) implemented the General 
Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018 and California implemented 
its Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) in January 2020.81  Both GDPR and 
CCPA have population limitations: EU subjects and California consumers, 
 
 78   COPPA compliance would be required if the software provider is for-profit and 
getting personal information directly from students under thirteen. See supra Part II(B) 
(explaining COPPA). 
 79   FERPA compliance would be required if school officials themselves are inputting PII 
about students. See supra Part II(D) (explaining FERPA).  
 80   See generally Ritvo, supra note 77, at 12 (comparing key coverage and terms of each 
of the big three federal student privacy laws). 
 81   See generally General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), REGULATION EU 
2016/679, https://gdpr-info.eu; California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), Title 1.81.5, 
https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa. 
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respectively.82  Despite these restrictions, both are groundbreaking in terms 
of establishing key components that should undergird any new federal 
privacy law: the need for specific, informed, opt-in individual permissions 
around data sharing, the need for data use limitations, and the need for 
specific forms of removal.83  While there has been a fair amount of federal 
legislative energy paid to privacy in recent years, lawmakers have not to date 
coalesced around a path forward.84  By starting with children’s privacy, 
PPLAY would address ongoing harms and ideally establish a foothold for 
crucial forward-looking privacy protections (along the lines of GDPR and 
CCPA) that could be developed further to include adults. 
III. PPLAY 
A. Why PPLAY? 
Establishing robust, comprehensive federal data privacy protection for 
children requires consideration of the different roles, capacities, and existing 
legal constructions of the key stakeholders.  Two overarching commitments 
emerge.  For individual actors who have relationships to children (including 
both personal relationships, like parents, and professional relationships, such 
as educators), the priority is to empower them with accessible tools for 
personal decision-making.  For institutional actors (chiefly tech companies), 
the priority is to establish and enforce firm limits on the activities in which 
they can engage with children’s personal data.  The new federal law 
proposed below looks to further both commitments. 
This new federal law, Protecting the Private Lives of Adolescents and 
Youth (PPLAY), would have four main components.  First, it would require 
a nutrition-style labeling system for digital technology products or services.  
This system would set out essential privacy and data collection information 
in clear, standardized terms to foster informed consumer decision-making.  
Second, it would create a lifelong prohibition on tech companies or other 
entities using all private digital data collected from any source about children 
under eighteen for targeted advertising or marketing to those children (as 
minors or adults).  Third, PPLAY would place the same prohibition for any 
use of this data by key gatekeepers to determine access to major life 
opportunities.  Fourth, it would require social media platforms to set up a 
 
 82   Id. 
 83   Id. 
 84   See, e.g., Roger Ford, With Digital Privacy Law, Don’t Repeat Mistakes of the Past, 
THE HILL (March 5, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/432628-with-digital-
privacy-law-dont-repeat-mistakes-of-the-past (arguing that federal government should 
continue to allow states to innovate around privacy even as it contemplates new national-level 
regulation). 
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removal review process for sharented content. 
To enforce PPLAY, there would be rights of data access and review, 
rights of removal, and a private right of action (with meaningful financial 
penalties and attorney fee provisions) for children against digital tech 
providers who violate their rights under PPLAY. 
B. Labeling System 
It is reasonable to maintain parents, grandparents, teachers, and other 
trusted adults in children’s lives on the front lines of deciding which tech 
devices or services belong in a home, school, or other environment.  Re-
configuring this decision-making process would threaten unnecessarily 
fundamental commitments to free consumer markets, as well as to protected 
spheres of personal or professional responsibility. 
There is a structural imbalance, however, between the information that 
digital tech devices and service providers have, and the information held by 
parents, educators, and other users.  As discussed above, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for end users of digital tech to have complete and accurate notice 
upon which to give meaningful consent for data collection and use. 
To move toward remedying this imbalance, PPLAY would require a 
nutrition-label style system of data collection and data privacy practices for 
all digital tech products and services used in inter-state commerce.  This label 
would be analogous to food labels which let the consumer know, prior to 
purchase, the food’s composition with respect to key categories of consumer 
health and wellness.85 
The data labeling scheme would cover three main areas: the types of 
data collected, the categories of data use, and the parties the data is shared 
with.  Although this scheme would still require consumer engagement and 
likely additional education around the meaning and value of the information 
conveyed, the information would become standardized and more readily 
accessible.  This shift represents an essential step forward in empowering 
individual decision-makers in their consumer purchasing and use. 
C. Prohibitions 
Even with greater empowerment, parents, teachers, and other trusted 
adults are not well-positioned to ensure that sharented content will not 
succumb to commercial targeting of children or to shape or restrict their 
current and future life opportunities.  The degree of commercial 
sophistication of individual adults varies greatly, with some being more 
 
 85   See Plunkett et al., supra note 73, at 19–21 (exploring the nutrition label concept for 
educational technologies specifically). 
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sophisticated than others.86  In addition, adults have different levels of 
commitment to protecting children’s privacy and opportunity.87  Respect 
does need to be maintained for parents’ and other trusted adults’ ability to 
establish what they believe to be the optimal digital privacy conditions for 
the children in their care.  This agency should not become a justification for 
eroding children’s privacy or opportunity. 
To preserve childhood and adolescence as protected spaces to play—to 
make mischief, make mistakes, and develop agency and autonomy—it is 
crucial to establish limits on the uses to which children’s private information 
can be put, either when they are still minors or when they have attained the 
age of majority.  As discussed above, absent such protections, children are 
likely to experience constraints in how they inhabit ostensibly protected 
spaces (most notably home and school), either in the moment or once they 
have occasion to realize what information was taken from them.  They are 
also likely to face limitations or barriers on their current or future life 
opportunities as sharented information is used by individuals or institutions 
to judge them—to make predictions or real-time decisions about them—in 
ways that they do not know and over which they lack legal control. 
Giving minors a legal right to determine whether their parent, teacher, 
or other trusted adult can sharent information about them would lead to 
unworkable complexities.  It is thus most efficient and most fair in terms of 
protection for all children nationwide to set the same baseline standard of 
non-consent for tech companies and other actors to use sharented 
information88 or any other information collected about them as children for 
targeted advertising or marketing as well as for decision-making.89 
 Under PPLAY, even once children turn eighteen, the private data 
collected about them as children could not be used to target them with 
advertising or marketing, although information collected from them after 
they become adults could be used for marketing and advertising. 
The same lifelong prohibition would apply to the use of private data to 
make predictions or decisions about children’s opportunities (whether as 
 
 86   But see Lewis, supra note 41 (arguing that adults as a whole lack the ability to 
meaningfully negotiate and enter into complex consumer contracts today). 
 87   See, e.g., C.S. Mott Children’s Hospital National Poll on Children’s Health, Parents 
on Social Media: Likes and Dislikes of Sharenting, vol. 23, issue 2, U. OF MICHIGAN HEALTH 
SYSTEM (Mar. 16, 2015), 
https://mottpoll.org/sites/default/files/documents/031615_sharenting_0.pdf (noting that 74% 
of poll respondents said that they knew of another parent who over-sharented). 
 88   The types of information protected under PPLAY would track the definition of 
“personal information” in CCPA. See 1.81.5 CA. CIV. CODE, § 1798.140(o)(1) (2020).  
 89   To limit this prohibition to sharented content only risks being unwieldy, as data source 
would need to be determined, and also would leave open a privacy protection gap where 
COPPA currently fails to protect. 
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minors or as adults) to gain access to major life activities, defined to include 
education, employment, health care, life insurance, health insurance, and 
similar opportunities. 
If another law or regulation permits a particular use of the data, or if the 
child’s parent (if the child is under sixteen) or the child themselves (if over 
sixteen) has specifically opted in the child for the use, then that limited use 
would be allowed under PPLAY. 
Taken together, the terms of these prohibitions aim to establish a solid 
protective zone of digital data privacy for childhood and adolescence, while 
still allowing reasonable space for informed parental or youth opt-in to 
specific uses of their data for marketing or decision-making that they deem 
to be beneficial. 
D. Removal 
The labeling and prohibition components of PPLAY address tech use 
by adults and data use by tech providers and other third parties.  They do not 
offer any recourse for children embarrassed, ashamed, or otherwise made 
uncomfortable by social media posts created by their parents, grandparents, 
or other adults.90  To put it another way, they do not address the way that 
unwelcome content may be maintained online and viewed.  Without 
addressing content maintenance and viewing, PPLAY would protect a child 
from having a college rely on analytics from their parents’ embarrassing 
social media posts about them in an admissions decision, but would not 
protect the child from the posts’ continued presence online such that their 
college roommates could view the material and form opinions about them 
based on it. 
The balance in this domain is particularly complex.  Parents, teachers, 
and other adults enjoy freedom of expression, both to the extent that certain 
free expression could be grounded in constitutional protections (especially 
for parents)91 and because the default user experience across social media 
platforms is unfettered exchange.  However, children (both as minors and 
upon attaining the age of majority) may experience significant distress or 
face interpersonal or reputational ramification as a result. 
To balance adult free expression and child privacy protection, PPLAY 
would create a right to erasure for adult posts if that content created sharented 
infliction of emotional distress92 and was unprotected by another source of 
 
 90   This prohibition under PPLAY could be extended to content minors share about 
themselves or other minors. 
 91   See PLUNKETT, supra note 7, at 113–15. 
 92   See generally STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 
II(16)(C)(1) (defining negligent infliction of emotional distress). The statutory term under 
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law or by a compelling adult interest.  PPLAY would require that social 
media companies operating in interstate commerce include this right in their 
terms of service and display it prominently on the site, in addition to the 
terms of service, such that the adult user would have notice that this type of 
content could be subject to removal if it inflicted emotional distress.93  
Children subjected to the sharented content (ages thirteen and above, 
including after attaining the age of majority) would have a right to request 
erasure from the social media company for seven years after they knew or 
should have known about the content.  Children under the age of thirteen 
would need to make the request through a “next friend,” which could be a 
parent, grandparent, educator, other trusted adult, or a neutral, professionally 
qualified adult.  Social media companies would be required to assign this 
neutral party to support removal requests from youth under the age of 
thirteen that came into the company without a next friend attached. 
The company would be required to review and respond to sharenting 
removal requests in a reasonable period of time using trained, impartial 
professional staff (PPLAY would not specify if that staff would need to be 
human or whether it could be AI).94  The first layer of inquiry would be 
whether or not the sharented content inflicted emotional distress that would 
be reasonable for a youth, young adult, or adult to experience as a result of 
the content, given the totality of the circumstances.  The second layer would 
be a determination of whether another law permitted the content, such as 
constitutional free speech protections for posts involving religion, in which 
case no take-down could occur.  The third layer would be a determination of 
whether a compelling interest—including such factors as business purpose—
exists separate from another area of law that would tip the balance toward 
retaining the content.  The PPLAY statute will broadly establish the factors 
giving rise to a compelling interest, including the mode of implementation, 
through the rule-making process. 
E. Enforcement 
In order to ensure compliance by tech companies, PPLAY would give 
children a right to access their digital records when they turn thirteen or 
 
PPLAY would have its own definition, not be beholden to the general one. 
 93   For previously sharented content, where the adult user would have lacked notice of 
this type of potential for take-down at the time of posting, the new provision would still be 
legally acceptable because of the catch-all language in click-wrap agreements that allows for 
updates to terms. For adults who have relied heavily on sharenting for a business interest, for 
example, that might be able to qualify as a “compelling interest” under PPLAY that would tip 
the balance against removal. 
 94   Regulatory oversight would rest with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which 
already oversees COPPA. 
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through a parent or other next friend while they are under sixteen.  There 
would be grounds for requesting removal or correction of digital data or for 
requesting an opt-in by the parent or digital guardian before a child is thirteen 
or by the child once they are thirteen—asking that the data be shared with 
tech companies, data brokers, schools, employers, or other gate-keepers for 
a specific reason.  These rights would be enforceable through a private right 
of action so that a child could bring a lawsuit against a company directly, 
either through their parent, next friend if a minor, or in their own right if aged 
eighteen or over. 
The penalties for violations would need to be set high enough to serve 
as an actual deterrent for PPLAY violations; the CCPA offers a starting point 
but would likely need revision to be effective.  PPLAY would also include 
fee-shifting statutes to compensate successful attorneys for becoming private 
attorneys general. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
PPLAY offers a blueprint for striking a workable balance between 
preserving parent, grandparent, educator, and other adult autonomy while 
establishing comprehensive privacy and life opportunity protections for 
youth in the care of these adults.  The implementing regulations would 
require multi-stakeholder input—or, to put it colloquially, be played around 
with—in order to precisely calibrate the balance between open online 
engagement, locked down privacy, and open future prospects for youth to 
figure out for themselves who they are meant to be.  
 
